By Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA
© Copyright 1999 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m67 m40 m47 c0299
lA New York court ruled that it was barred by the first amendment from resolving a woman's claim that she had been injured by a priest's repeated sexual contacts with her. A woman (the "victim") was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. She turned to her priest for comfort and direction, and the priest began to visit her three and four times a week. While sitting next to her on the couch he allegedly would hold her cramped and contorted fingers and tell her how he spoke to God and how as God's emissary he would see to it that the disease would go into remission. Indeed, at one point her physician informed her that the disease was indeed in remission and she "thanked God a million times for sending her this gentle savior." In time, the priest began to engage in repeated sexual contacts with the victim. Eventually, the relationship ended, and the woman sued the priest and a local diocese. She claimed that the diocese was responsible for the priest's actions on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty.
using neutral principles to resolve religious disputes
A state appeals court began its opinion by acknowledging that "civil controversies involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the first amendment as long as neutral laws of general applicability are utilized in their resolution." It noted that the "secular rule" to be applied in this case is the law of fiduciaries. It continued:
This area of the law recognizes that there is an imbalance inherent
in certain relationships which places one party at a disadvantage in its
dealings with the other party. Courts have therefore imposed additional
obligations upon the advantaged party to compensate for the disparity.
Because the parameters of a fiduciary relationship have been vaguely defined
and the range of relationships that can potentially be characterized as
fiduciary is extensive, we are grateful for the guidance offered by one
commentator who has distilled four elements that we believe are essential
to the establishment of a fiduciary relationship: (1) The vulnerability
of one party to the other which (2) results in the empowerment of the stronger
party by the weaker which (3) empowerment has been solicited or accepted
by the stronger party and (4) prevents the weaker party from effectively
protecting itself.
The court noted that "historically, fiduciary relationships include trustee to beneficiary; guardian to ward; agent to principal; attorney to client; executor to legatees or beneficiaries; partner to partner; corporate directors or officers to the corporation; majority shareholders to other shareholders; and bailor to bailee." A fiduciary relationship "is one founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another," and "exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused . . . in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed."
applying neutral principles to neutral facts
The court cautioned that in resolving religious disputes on the basis of "neutral principles" it is not sufficient to be able to identify relevant secular rules. It is also necessary to insure that "there exist neutral facts to which to apply those rules." This requirement was not met in this case, the court concluded:
Here, in order for plaintiff's cause of action to meet constitutional muster, the jury would have to be able to determine that a fiduciary relationship existed and premise this finding on neutral facts. The insurmountable difficulty facing plaintiff, this court holds, lies in the fact that it is impossible to show the existence of a fiduciary relationship without resort to religious facts. In order to consider the validity of plaintiff's claims of dependency and vulnerability, the jury would have to weigh and evaluate . . . the legitimacy of plaintiff's beliefs, the tenets of the faith insofar as they reflect upon a priest's ability to act as God's emissary and the nature of the healing powers of the church. To instruct a jury on such matters is to venture into forbidden ecclesiastical terrain. On the other hand, if we try to salvage plaintiff's claim by stripping her narrative of all religious nuance, what is left makes out a cause of action in seduction-a tort no longer recognized in New York-but not in breach of a fiduciary duty.
no fiduciary relationship existed
The court also concluded that the victim could not pursue a breach of fiduciary duty claim because no fiduciary relationship existed. It noted that the victim's account of the relationship "when considered without reference to her religious beliefs describes the development of an intimate personal relationship based upon the fact that she was seriously ill, lonely and isolated and needed a sympathetic ear. She found a willing and sympathetic friend and companion in [her priest] who, according to her narrative, was able to use this situation to his advantage and transform the relationship into a sexual one. This neutered account does not supply the facts necessary to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship because the most important element defining the fiduciary relationship, and distinguishing it from a merely confidential relationship-the inability of the weaker partner to resist the manipulation of the stronger partner-is missing from the neutered account. This element is present only in the religious account of their relationship in statements such as those pertaining to her belief that she would lose her lifeline to continued health if she resisted defendant's advances."
Application. In recent years, many victims of clergy sexual misconduct have sued their church on the ground that the minister's behavior amounts to a breach of a "fiduciary duty" to the victim for which the church is responsible. Some victims have further alleged that the church itself owes a fiduciary duty to its members which is violated when a minister or other staff member or volunteer engages in inappropriate sexual contact with a member. Most courts have rejected such a basis of liability, and this case illustrates this line of cases. It also demonstrates that the first amendment can be used by churches to defend against a breach of fiduciary duty claim, since a finding of such a duty would require a civil court to delve into religious issues. Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436 (A.D. 1998). [Seduction of Counselees and Church Members, Negligence as a Basis for Liability, Denominational Liability]