By Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA
© Copyright 1993, 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m53 m65 c0593
Key point: Statements made to
others concerning a matter of common interest are protected by a
"qualified privilege," meaning that they cannot be defamatory
unless made with malice.
An Ohio appeals court ruled that a former
teacher at a church-operated school could not sue school officials
for defamation since the allegedly defamatory statements made by
the school officials concerned a matter of "common interest" and
accordingly were privileged. A teacher at a church-operated
school was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
for providing alcohol to one of his students. He advised school
officials of his conviction, and was permitted to remain on the
faculty both as a teacher and yearbook adviser. A few years later,
his teaching contract was not renewed. A priest was hired to
replace him as teacher and yearbook adviser. When the former
teacher continued to associate with student members of the yearbook
staff, two priests (who served as administrators at the school)
contacted the parents of two of these students and informed them
that the former teacher had been convicted of "corrupting a minor,"
implied that he was a homosexual, and recommended that they not
permit their sons to associate with such a person. The former
teacher learned of these statements, and sued the priests for
defamation. A trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and the former
teacher appealed. A state appeals court agreed with the trial court
that the statements made by the priests were not defamatory since
they were protected by a qualified privilege. The court defined
defamation as a false oral or written statement made about another
person that injures his or her reputation. However, it noted that
[a] communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest . . . is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest . . . even though it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be [defamatory] . . . . The essential elements of a conditionally privileged communication may accordingly be enumerated as good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only. The privilege arises from the necessity of full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest . . . .
As a matter of public policy, educators and parents share a common interest in the training, morality and well-being of the children in their care. Because of this shared interest, a relationship exists between the educators of a child and the parents of that child in which a right, and in many instances a duty, to communicate information concerning the education and well-being of that child arises. The occasions presented in this case are examples of such a relationship. . . . [S]tatements made by a teacher and a principal which relate to a former teacher's interference in the educational process or commission of acts which are potentially harmful to the well-being of a student, when made to the parents of the student involved, can be motivated by a common interest in education or safety of that student. Further, the statements were imparted only to those parents who had a common interest in their continued association with the yearbook . . . . Accordingly, the trial court properly found that a qualified privilege existed as a matter of law.