Copyright Law
By Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA
© Copyright 1991, 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m36
1. IN GENERAL1
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to enact laws that “promote the progress of . . . [the] useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective writings.” In 1790, under the power granted by the new Constitution, Congress enacted the first copyright law. Congress enacted several other copyright laws in the ensuing years, and in 1870 enacted the first comprehensive copyright statute. This law was substantially revised in 1909. In 1976, Congress enacted a newly revised copyright act, which became effective on January 1, 1978. The new law is known as the Copyright Act of 1976.
In commenting on the purpose of the original constitutional provision, the United States Supreme Court has observed:
[The Constitution] describes both the objective which Congress may seek and the means to achieve it. The objective is to promote the progress of . . . the arts. . . . To accomplish its purpose, Congress may grant to authors the exclusive right to the fruits of their respective works. An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may preclude others from copying his creation for commercial purposes without permission. In other words, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, Congress may guarantee to authors . . . a reward in the form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works.2
Compensation of authors is thus a secondary purpose of the copyright law.
2. SECURING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
a. Initial Copyright Protection
The objective of copyright law is to promote the progress of the useful arts by granting authors certain exclusive rights in their works. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, an author receives initial copyright protection as soon as he creates an original work of authorship and fixes it in any tangible medium of expression.3 There are then three prerequisites to initial copyright protection in a work: (1) the work must be original, (2) it must be a work of authorship, and (3) it must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
A work is original if an author created it by his or her own skill, labor, and judgment, and not by directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. One court has stated that “[o]riginality means that the work owes its creation to the author and thus in turn means that the work must not consist of actual copying.”4 In summary, originality connotes independent creation.
Originality does not necessarily mean novelty or creativity. One court observed that “there must be independent creation, but it need not be invention in the sense of striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty,” and that the test of originality “is concededly one with a low threshold in that `all that is needed . . . is that the author contributed something more than a merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own.'”5
For a work to be entitled to initial copyright protection, it must constitute a work of authorship as defined by the Copyright Act. Section 102 of the Act provides that works of authorship include
1. literary works, such as books, periodicals, and manuscripts
2. musical works, including any accompanying words
3. dramatic works, including any accompanying music
4. pantomimes and choreographic works
5. pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
6. motion pictures and other audiovisual works
7. sound recordings
Names and titles are not subject to copyright protection. They may be entitled to protection under federal trademark law if they are affixed to or associated with products or services and serve to identify the source of the products or services in a unique way.
Section 103 stipulates that compilations and derivative works also are entitled to copyright protection. A compilation is defined as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre--existing materials . . . that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” A derivative work is defined as “a work based upon one or more pre--existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”
For a work to be entitled to initial copyright protection, it must be fixed in some tangible medium of expression. Ideas, concepts, and discoveries therefore are not eligible for copyright protection until they are reduced to a tangible form.
b. Post--Publication Copyright Protection
The initial copyright protection that an author receives under the Copyright Act persists until the author publishes his work. The Act defines publication as “the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”1 Once an author publishes a work, he or she may have to comply with certain other requirements to perpetuate the initial copyright protection.
(1) Works First Published Before March 1, 1989
For works published prior to March 1, 1989, section 401(a) of the Copyright Act specified:
Whenever a work . . . is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
This requirement is known as the “notice” requirement, and compliance with it is essential to the continuation of copyright protection following the publication of a work first published prior to March 1, 1989. No registration was necessary to perfect copyright protection in a work first published before March 1, 1989.
(2) Works First Published on or after March 1, 1989
On March 1, 1989, the United States became a party to the “Berne Convention”—an international copyright convention established a century ago and endorsed by nearly 80 nations. Participation by the United States in this significant convention generally will increase the international protections available to American authors. To become a party to the convention, Congress had to make various changes in our copyright law (unwillingness to make the required changes was one of the major reasons that it took the United States a century to join the convention). Perhaps the most important change related to copyright notice. Mandatory notice of copyright has been abolished for works published for the first time on or after March 1, 1989. Failure to place a copyright notice on copies of works that are publicly distributed can no longer result in the loss of copyright. Obviously, this is a significant change in our copyright law, since prior to March 1, 1989, the failure to affix a valid copyright notice to a publicly distributed work could have resulted in loss of copyright protection. While copyright notices are no longer required to obtain copyright protection in works first published on or after March 1, 1989, the Copyright Office “strongly recommends” that publishers place a notice of copyright on such works. One of the benefits of such notices is that an infringer will not be able to claim that he or she “innocently infringed” a work. In summary, while in some cases a copyright notice may no longer be a technical requirement, it should nevertheless always be used.
The Berne Convention is not retroactive. Accordingly, the notice requirements for works first published prior to March 1, 1989, remain unchanged. To illustrate, works first published between January 1, 1978 and February 28, 1989 without a valid copyright notice (as defined below) generally lost their copyright protection unless they were registered with the Copyright Office within five years of first publication (and a valid notice added to all copies distributed after discovery of the omission). Works first published before January 1, 1978 without a valid copyright notice generally lost all copyright protection immediately (with some exceptions). Obviously, the change in the notice requirement will result in considerable confusion among churches regarding the copyright status of literary or musical works. For example, suppose that a church would like to make copies of a piece of sheet music. The fact that the music does not bear a copyright notice does not mean that the work is not copyrighted. Clearly, it will now be more difficult for churches to determine whether or not they are free to make copies of some works. Churches cannot safely assume that a work is “in the public domain” merely because it does not contain a valid copyright notice.
In summary, while copyright notices are no longer technically required for most works first published on or after March 1, 1989, they should still be used.
What, then, is a valid copyright notice? The contents and placement of a valid copyright notice are described in sections 401(b) and (c) of the Copyright Act. A valid notice consists of three elements: (1) the symbol ©, or the word “Copyright”, or the abbreviation “Copr.”; and (2) the year of first publication of the work (in the case of compilations and derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient); and (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner.
Section 401(c) provides that the notice shall be affixed to copies of the work “in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.” To illustrate, Copyright Office regulations specify that a copyright notice for a work published in book form may be affixed on the title page, the page immediately following the title page, either side of the front or back cover, the first page of the main body of the work, the last page of the main body of the work, or any page between the front page and first page of the main body of the work if there are no more than 10 pages between the front page and the first page of the main body of the work and the notice is prominently displayed and set apart. Similar rules apply to musical works. Other rules apply to single--leaf works, audiovisual works, machine--readable works, and pictorial works. The Copyright Office regulations themselves provide that they merely illustrate acceptable notice placements. They are not exhaustive, and acceptable alternatives probably exist. Of course, it is prudent to follow the Copyright Office guidelines since compliance with them is conclusive evidence that you have affixed your copyright notice in an appropriate position.
What is the effect of a work that is published with a defective or omitted notice? Works first published on or after March 1, 1989, require no copyright notice and so an omitted or defective notice has no legal effect. However, note that section 401(d) of the Copyright Act specifies that if a work first published on or after March 1, 1989 contains a valid copyright notice, “then no weight shall be given” to an “innocent infringement” defense. That is, no infringer can argue that he or she “innocently” infringed on another's work if that work contained a valid copyright notice. If the notice does not satisfy the requirements of sections 401(b) and 401(c), the implication is that an infringer can assert an innocent infringement defense. The same concept applies to phonorecords under section 402(d). What about works first published prior to March 1, 1989? Section 405(a) of the Copyright Act specifies:
With respect to copies and phonorecords publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner before [March 1, 1989], the omission of the copyright notice described in sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copyright in a work if(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of copies . . . distributed to the public; or
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies . . . that are distributed to the public in the United States after the omission has been discovered; or
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in writing that, as a condition of the copyright owner's authorization of the public distribution of copies . . . they bear the prescribed notice.
Also, note that if someone distributes copies of a copyrighted work without authorization from the copyright owner, and no copyright notice appears on such copies, the copyright in the work is not affected since the copies were made and distributed without authorization.
Can one be guilty of copyright infringement for innocently infringing on a copyrighted work from which the copyright notice had been omitted? For works first published on or after March 1, 1989, the answer is yes—since copyright notices are no longer required to ensure copyright protection. However, the Copyright Act indicates that an infringer can assert the defense of “innocent infringement” to avoid or reduce damages if the infringed work either had no copyright notice or had a defective notice (not meeting the requirements of sections 401(b) and 401(c). What if the work was first published prior to March 1, 1989? Assuming that the omission of the copyright notice did not invalidate the copyright (i.e., one of the three exceptions referred to above applies), the innocent infringer incurs no liability for any infringing acts “committed before receiving actual notice that registration for the work has been made . . . if such person proves that he or she was misled by the omission of notice.”2 Omission of copyright notice ordinarily will result in loss of copyright protection (in works first published before March 1, 1989) if none of the three exceptions described above applies.
A related question is the effect of an error in the copyright notice. For example, what if a notice has an error in the name of the copyright owner, or in the date of first publication, or either the name or date is omitted? The copyright law specifies that if the name listed in a copyright notice is not the name of the copyright owner, the copyright in the work is not affected. In some cases, innocent infringers are protected if they were misled by the recital of the wrong person in the copyright notice.3 If a copyright notice recites a year of first publication that is more than one year later than the year in which publication in fact first occurred, the work is considered to have been published without any notice. If the notice recites a year of first publication that is earlier than the actual year of first publication, the copyright in the work is not affected but any period of time computed from the year of publication for purposes of any provision in the copyright law is computed from the erroneous date.4 Finally, if a copyright notice contains either no name or no date, the work is considered to have been published without any notice.5
3. THE DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT
Although copyright registration is not required, the Copyright Act establishes a mandatory deposit requirement for works published with notice of copyright in the United States. In general, the copyright owner, or the owner of the exclusive right of publication in a work, has a legal obligation to deposit in the Copyright Office, within three months of publication, two copies (or in the case of sound recordings, two phonorecords) for the use of the Library of Congress. Failure to make the deposit can result in fines and penalties, but does not affect copyright protection. Under section 408(b) of the Act, a single deposit can satisfy both the deposit and registration requirements. This provision requires that the single copy must be accompanied by the prescribed application and registration fee. The Copyright Office regulations exempt various kinds of works from the deposit requirements, including sermons and speeches (when published individually and not as a collection of the works of one or more authors), literary or musical works published only as embodied in phonorecords, computer programs published only in the form of machine--readable copies, and works first published as individual contributions to collective works.
4. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
Who owns the copyright in a work, and what difference does it make? Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act states simply that “[c]opyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or authors of the work.” There is very little difficulty in understanding this provision. The copyright law goes on to state that “the authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.” Again, this is straightforward and needs no explanation. There is one aspect of copyright ownership that is more difficult to understand, namely, a “work made for hire.”
It comes as a surprise to some persons that they do not necessarily own the copyright in certain works that they create. While the one who creates a work generally is its author and the initial owner of the copyright in the work, section 201(b) of the Copyright Act provides that “[i]n the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” The copyright law defines “work made for hire” as either “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” or “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as part of an . . . audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”
The first type of work made for hire is more common, and requires the following elements: (1) the person creating the work is an employee, and (2) the employee created the work within the scope of his or her employment. Whether or not one is an employee will depend on the same factors used in determining whether one is an employee or self--employed for federal income tax reporting purposes (see chapter 1 Status—Employee or Self-employed). However, the courts have been very liberal in finding employee status in this context, so it is entirely possible that a court would conclude that a work is a work made for hire even though the author reports his or her federal income taxes as a self--employed person (in many cases, those who report their federal income taxes as self--employed would be considered employees by the IRS). The second requirement is that the work must have been created within the scope of an employee's employment. This requirement generally means that the work was created during regular working hours, on the employer's premises, using the employer's staff and equipment. This is often a difficult standard to apply. As a result, it is desirable for employees (and self--employed persons who might be characterized as employees by a court) to address this issue in their contract of employment. Section 201(a), quoted above, allows an employer and employee to agree in writing that copyright ownership in works created by the employee within the scope of his or her employment belongs to the employee. This should be a matter for consideration by any church having a minister or other staff member who creates literary or musical works during office hours, on church premises, using church staff and church equipment (e.g., typewriters, computers, library, secretaries, dictation equipment). To illustrate, the founder of one religious organization entered into an agreement with the organization requiring that the copyright in all books written by him be held in his name.6
The second type of work made for hire, as noted above, is “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as part of an . . . audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” Most of these terms are defined in section 101 of the Copyright Act. Note that for a commissioned work to be a work for hire, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the work must be one of the specific types of works listed (audiovisual work, translation, etc.), (2) the work must have been commissioned by another party, and (3) the parties must have both signed a written instrument characterizing the work as a work made for hire. A work generally is “commissioned” if one party requests another to prepare it.
5. DURATION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
A copyright does not last for an indefinite or unlimited time. The provision in the United States Constitution giving Congress authority to create copyright protection specifies that such protection shall be only “for limited times.” The “limited times” vary depending upon the circumstances. Under the copyright law that was in effect before 1978, copyright was secured either on the date a work was published (with an appropriate copyright notice), or on the date of registration if the work was registered in unpublished form. In either case, the copyright lasted for a first term of 28 years from the date it was secured. During the last (28th) year of the first term, the copyright was eligible for renewal. If renewed, the copyright was extended for a second term of 28 years. If not renewed, the copyright expired at the end of the first 28--year term.
Copyrights in their second (renewal) term of 28 years between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, were automatically extended by the Copyright Act of 1976 to last for a total term of 75 years (a first term of 28 years plus a renewal term of 47 years) from the end of the year in which they were originally secured. As noted above, this rule also applies to copyrights whose second 28--year term would have expired between September 19, 1962, and December 31, 1977, but for the interim protection provided by Congress.
Copyrights in their first 28--year term on January 1, 1978, will still have to be renewed in order to be protected for a second term. If a valid renewal registration is made at the proper time, the second term will last for an additional 47 years (19 years longer than the 28--year renewal term under the old law). However, if renewal registration for these works is not made within the statutory time limits, a copyright originally secured between 1950 and 1977 will expire on December 31st of its 28th year, and protection will be lost permanently. The adoption of the “Berne Convention” by Congress does not affect these rules.
For works that are created and fixed in a tangible medium of expression for the first time on or after January 1, 1978, the Copyright Act of 1976 does away with all renewal requirements and establishes a single copyright term. However, the length of the single term depends upon the circumstances. For most works, the new copyright law has adopted the basic “life--plus--50” system already in effect in most countries. That is, a work that is created (i.e., fixed in a tangible form for the first time) on or after January 1, 1978, is automatically protected from the moment of its creation, and is given a term lasting for the author's life, plus an additional 50 years after the author's death. In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors who did not work for hire, the term lasts 50 years after the last surviving author's death. For works made for hire, and for anonymous and pseudonymous works (unless the author's identity is revealed in Copyright Office records), the duration of the copyright will be 75 years from first publication or 100 years from the creation of the work, whichever is shorter.7
6. REGISTRATION
The owner of a copyright in a work may register the copyright claim by delivering two complete copies of the best edition of a published work or one complete copy of an unpublished work, along with an application form and the application fee (currently $20) to the Copyright Office. Deposits made to fulfill the deposit requirements of Section 407 may be used to satisfy the deposit requirements for registration if they are accompanied by the appropriate application form and the prescribed fee. Section 408(a) unequivocally states that “registration is not a condition of copyright protection.” While registration is not necessary to secure copyright protection, it is advisable in some cases for a variety of reasons, including the following:
1. It is an inexpensive and simple procedure.
2. Section 411 of the Copyright Act provides that “no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made . . . .” This is a significant advantage of registration. If the copyright claim has not been registered, the copyright owner cannot seek redress in the civil courts for acts of infringement. A number of courts have held, however, that a copyright owner of an unregistered work can sue an infringer by simply registering the claim of copyright even though the infringement occurred prior to registration. This rule would not apply if the infringement suit were brought after the limitations period (generally 3 years) following the initial act of infringement.
3. Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act allows a copyright owner to collect “statutory damages” from an infringer in lieu of proving actual damages. Statutory damages ordinarily range from $500 to $20,000 per violation, and they often comprise the only meaningful measure of damages since actual damages are difficult to prove. However, section 412 specifies that “no award of statutory damages . . . shall be made for (1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the effective date of its registration, or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work.”
4. Section 410(c) provides that “[i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” What is the significance of this rule? Simply this—a copyright claimant who has registered a claim of copyright in a work within five years before or after first publication does not have the burden of proving the validity of the copyright claim in an infringement suit.
5. Section 205(c) of the Copyright Act provides that “[r]ecordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if . . . registration has been made for the work.” This provision means that the public is “on notice” of any transfers, licenses, mortgages, and other documents pertaining to copyrights if such documents are recorded in the Copyright Office and the underlying works are registered.
6. Generally, omission of a valid copyright notice from a work first published before March 1, 1989 invalidates the copyright in the work. However, section 405(a)(2) of the Copyright Act provides that omission of the notice on such a work will not invalidate the copyright if “registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the public in the United States after the omission has been discovered.”
7. The Copyright Office reviews every application for registration to ensure that the legal formalities needed to ensure protection are satisfied. Often, the Copyright Office will call to the attention of a copyright owner an error in the registration application or in the copyright notice that can ensure that copyright protection is preserved. This review, however, is limited to the applicant's compliance with technical requirements. The merits of a particular claim of copyright ordinarily are not evaluated.
8. Registration of a copyright in some cases may enhance the marketability of an author's or composer's work. For example, a person checking Copyright Office records on a particular subject may inadvertently find a work, and contact the copyright owner regarding a publishing opportunity.
9. Registration of a musical work may entitle the copyright owner to “compulsory royalty payments” in the event that someone else makes a recording of the work. This provision has special relevance in the context of audio recording of church worship services in which copyrighted music is performed.
10. Registration of a work published prior to 1978 and still in its first 28--year term is required in order to extend the copyright term of such a work.
Copyright registration is a fairly simple procedure in many cases. To register a work, send the following three items in the same envelope or package to the Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20559:
(a) A properly completed application form. Complete the application using black ink or a typewriter, and either an original Copyright Office form or a clear photocopy made on a good grade of white paper. Applications not meeting these requirements will be returned. There are several registration forms. The more commonly used forms include: (a) Form TX for non--dramatic literary works (e.g., compilations, computer programs, contributions to periodicals, dissertations, fiction, lectures, letters, nonfiction, poetry, sermons, song lyrics without music), (b) Form PA for published and unpublished works of the performing arts (musical and dramatic works, choreographic works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works), and (c) Form SR for published and unpublished sound recordings (e.g., music, sermons).
(b) A nonrefundable filing fee of $20 per application.
(c) A nonrefundable deposit of the work being registered. The deposit requirements vary in particular situations. Generally, two copies of the work must be filed along with the registration application. Section 408(b) of the Copyright Act specifies that the deposit and registration requirements can be satisfied simultaneously.
7. THE COPYRIGHT OWNER'S EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives a copyright owner the following five “exclusive rights:”
(a) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(b) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(c) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(d) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(e) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
These five exclusive rights are sometimes referred to as the rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. They comprise the “bundle of rights” that constitute or define copyright. It is unlawful for anyone to violate any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. These rights, however, are not unlimited in scope. The approach of the Copyright Act is to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in sections 107 through 118 of the Act.
8. INFRINGEMENT
Section 501 of the Copyright Act states that “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.” Of the five exclusive rights, the one causing the most difficulties for churches is the copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce the work (i.e., make copies). Obviously, an infringement occurs when someone makes a verbatim copy of copyrighted material. But what if someone produces a work that is similar but not identical to another's copyrighted work? Can this constitute infringement on the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction? The courts generally have resolved this question by applying the following presumption—access by the alleged infringer to the copyrighted material, plus substantial similarity between the allegedly infringing material and the copyrighted work, creates a presumption of infringement. The alleged infringer of course can claim that his work was an independent creation. However, the closer the similarity between the two works, the less likely it is that such a claim will prevail. Other relevant factors to consider in such a case would be the experience and training of the alleged infringer, his previous publishing record, the likelihood that he was capable of independently producing the work, and prior instances of infringement on his part. Some copyright owners intentionally insert errors in their works. The alleged infringer's claim of independent creation will seldom succeed if such errors are duplicated.
The House Report to the Copyright Act of 1976 specifies that “wide departures or variations from the copyrighted work would still be an infringement as long as the author's `expression' rather than merely the author's `ideas' are taken.”8
What about paraphrasing? For example, does infringement occur if a reproduction does not contain any “word--for--word” copying of original material but merely paraphrases it? Probably so, since a number of courts have held that “paraphrasing is tantamount to copying in copyright law.”9 Another court has observed that copying “cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”10
Another difficult question is the verbatim copying of only small portions of copyrighted material. When does such use constitute infringement on the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction? There is no easy answer to this question. Courts generally evaluate both the quantity of copyrighted material that is copied verbatim, and its quality. That is, what percentage of the copyrighted work was copied, and how much of the allegedly infringing work consisted of the copied material? Further, how significant was the “quality” of the copied material? Was it the essence of the work as a whole, or was it incidental or insignificant? To illustrate, the courts have found copying of the following amounts of copyrighted material to constitute copyright infringement: (1) two identical bars of a musical work;11 (2) four notes and two words, which comprised the “heart of the composition;”12 (3) three sentences (that were used for advertising purposes);13 (4) three sentences;14 (5) eight sentences;15 (6) less than one percent of the copyrighted work;16 and, (7) the phrase “put on a happy face.”17
However, copying of the following portions of copyrighted material was held not to constitute infringement upon the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction: (1) a sentence and a half;18 (2) sixteen words;19 and (3) two sentences.20
Such precedent leaves little doubt that most reproductions of copyrighted materials by churches will constitute an infringement of the exclusive right of copyright owners to reproduce their works. To cite just a few examples—the copying of copyrighted chorus or hymn lyrics onto a transparency or bulletin insert ordinarily will amount to an infringement, since a substantial quantity of the original work is reproduced, the amount reproduced is significant in terms of quality, and the copy serves the same function as the original work. To illustrate, in one case a publisher reproduced the chorus lyrics of two famous copyrighted songs in songsheet pamphlets, maintaining that the reproduction of only chorus lyrics of copyrighted songs was so trivial in nature and amount as to constitute noninfringing fair use. The court found such reproductions to be an infringement, and rejected the publisher's claim that its reproductions constituted fair use. Though only the chorus lyrics were reproduced (and not the regular verse lines or music), the court found that “the chorus of a musical composition may constitute a material and substantial part of the work and it is frequently the very part that makes it popular and valuable.”21 Similarly, another court found the reproduction of chorus lyrics in a song sheet magazine to be an infringement rather than fair use, since the reproduction “met the same demand on the same market” as the original.22 The courts in each of these two cases gave a narrow interpretation of fair use because the function served by the infringing use directly satisfied a function that was served by the copyright owner's sheet music.
Obviously, verbatim copying of the lyrics and melody of a copyrighted musical work (for use by the choir, a soloist, an accompanist, or an instrumental group) would constitute infringement.
Often overlooked is the fact that both the musical score and lyrics of a hymn or chorus are eligible for copyright protection. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act states that copyright protection subsists in original “musical works, including any accompanying words,” that are reduced to a tangible form. Persons who compose both the music and lyrics of an original hymn are entitled to copyright protection for both. This has important consequences. It means, primarily, that no one can make copies of either the music or lyrics without authorization. To illustrate, a church will infringe upon this copyright protection if it inserts only the words of a particular song in a booklet or on a songsheet, or reproduces them on a piece of paper and projects them onto a screen.
It is also important to recognize that one of the copyright owner's exclusive rights is the right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. Derivative works include musical arrangements. Therefore, it is not permissible for anyone other than the copyright owner or one whom the copyright owner has authorized to create an arrangement of a copyrighted musical work. To illustrate, one church choir director who made a choral arrangement of a copyrighted hymn without authorization was found to be guilty of copyright infringement.23 The director's arrangement consisted of the entire score of the copyrighted hymn plus the insertion of a four--measure introduction. The director made several copies of his arrangement on the church's duplicating machine. Each copy contained the director's name and identified him as the arranger. The copyright owner brought a lawsuit against the director and his church, alleging copyright infringement. A federal appeals court found the director and his employing church jointly liable for copyright infringement. The court found the director's lack of intent to infringe to be irrelevant, and concluded that the copying of all or substantially all of a copyrighted musical work could not be considered “fair use.”
It is permissible to make arrangements of preexisting musical works if the preexisting work is in the public domain or if the copyright owner of the preexisting work grants permission. Section 103 of the Act states that lawfully made derivative works are entitled to copyright protection if they otherwise qualify. Section 103 also stipulates that copyright protection in a derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work. Thus, although a musical arrangement of a public domain song is subject to copyright protection, the copyright protection extends only to the new musical score and not to the lyrics of the preexisting work. As a result, churches can copy the lyrics of such arrangements without infringing the arranger's copyright.
A federal court has rejected the claim that the first amendment right to freely exercise one's religion immunized from liability for copyright infringement a group of priests who toured the country giving unauthorized performances of the rock opera Jesus Christ Superstar.24
9. EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
a. The Religious Services Exemption
Section 110(3) of the Copyright Act specifies that the “performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work or of a dramatico--musical work of a religious nature, or display of a work, in the course of services at a place of worship or other religious assembly” is not an infringement of copyright. Performance of a nondramatic literary work means reading from a book or periodical in a nondramatic manner. Thus, for example, a copyrighted translation of the Bible can be quoted publicly in the course of religious services, as can any book or periodical of a religious nature. Without the exception contained in section 110, such readings might constitute copyright infringement since one of a copyright owner's exclusive rights is the right to perform his work publicly. Similarly, a copyrighted musical work of a religious nature can be performed in the course of services at a place of worship or other religious assembly. Therefore copyrighted hymns, solo materials, orchestrations, and choral arrangements of a religious nature may be performed in religious services. Without the exception contained in section 110, such performances might constitute copyright infringements. Dramatico--musical works of a religious nature may also be performed in the course of religious services. Such works include certain performances of sacred music that may be regarded as dramatic, such as oratorios and cantatas. Also exempted from copyright infringement are displays of works of all kinds in the course of religious services.The exemption is not intended to cover performances of secular operas, musical plays, motion pictures, and the like, even if they have an underlying religious or philosophical theme and take place in the course of religious services.
To be exempted under section 110, a performance or display must be “in the course of services,” and thus activities at a place of worship that are for social, educational, fundraising, or entertainment purposes are excluded. Some performances of these kinds may be exempted under section 110(4). This section exempts from copyright infringement certain performances of nondramatic literary or musical works that are performed without admissions charge or that are performed with an admissions charge if the proceeds are used exclusively for educational, religious, or charitable purposes and not for private financial gain, unless the copyright owner has served notice of objection to the performance at least seven days before the performance.
Since the performance or display must also occur “at a place of worship or other religious assembly” the exemption would not extend to religious broadcasts or other transmissions to the public at large, even if the transmissions were sent from a place of worship. Nor would the exemption apply to the public distribution of tape recordings of religious services containing any copyrighted materials. Thus, while a copyrighted religious musical work may be performed at a religious service, publicly distributed tape recordings of the service that reproduce the copyrighted work do not constitute a performance of the work in the course of services at a place of worship and, accordingly, such recordings are not exempt under section 110. On the other hand, as long as services are being conducted before a religious assembly, the exemption would apply even if they were conducted in such places as auditoriums and outdoor theaters.
The exemption provided by section 110 exempts only religious performances in the course of religious services from copyright infringement. The Act states that to perform a work means to recite or render it. Performance of a copyrighted hymn or choral arrangement thus means to sing it, and performance of a copyrighted cantata means to present it. There is therefore no license to copy a copyrighted work, such as by duplicating a single piece of music for all of the members of a choir, since duplication does not constitute a performance even though the duplicated copies may eventually be used in a performance. Only the copyright owner has the right to reproduce a copyrighted work by making copies. Similarly, a church may not assemble a booklet of copyrighted hymns or choruses (lyrics or music) for use by its members in the course of religious services since this would necessitate copying the protected works. Of course, a church can duplicate a musical work or lyrics whose copyright term has expired or that never was subject to copyright protection since such works are considered to be in the public domain.
In 1976, a publisher of religious music sued the Catholic Bishop of Chicago as representative of various churches in the archdiocese of Chicago that allegedly were infringing upon the publisher's copyrights by unauthorized duplication and use of its songs in “homemade or pirated hymnals” prepared for use in worship services. As a result of an agreement between the parties, over 80,000 “homemade” hymnals and song collections containing the allegedly infringing materials were collected from parishes in Chicago and impounded by the court. Thereafter, the publisher investigated other large dioceses and archdioceses in the United States to determine if unauthorized copying was occurring elsewhere. The publisher, claiming to have found copyright violations nationwide, notified the bishop in each area that local parishes were violating the copyright law by reproducing the publisher's copyrighted music without permission in the “pirated” songbooks. The publisher requested the bishops' assistance in determining the extent of the violations, and in voluntarily compensating it for the violations. When no assistance or compensation was offered, the publisher sought a court injunction restraining the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) from further violations of the copyright law.25 Specifically, the publisher alleged that the NCCB and USCC violated the law by
[f]ailing to provide adequate direction to the dioceses and parishes concerning the proper use of [the publisher's] copyrighted materials and thereby caused, permitted and materially contributed to the publication, distribution and/or sale in many of the archdioceses and dioceses . . . of songbooks including songs which were copies largely from [the publisher's] aforementioned copyrighted work.26
The court, while refusing to grant an injunction, did recognize that the publisher had stated a claim for which relief could be granted.
b. Fair Use
Section 107 of the Copyright Act specifies that
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified [in section 106], for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Fair use is one of the most common defenses invoked by persons charged with copyright infringement. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to define. Even section 107 does not define the term but rather recites “factors to be considered” in determining if a particular use is a fair use.
There is little doubt that many reproductions of copyrighted materials by churches will fail to constitute noninfringing fair use. Certainly any verbatim copying of an entire work will almost never constitute fair use. Examples of this type of copying include the duplication of a musical work for members of the choir, a bulletin insert, a soloist, accompanist, instrumental group, or for use as a transparency or slide. Even copying of a significant portion (in terms of either quantity or quality) of a copyrighted work ordinarily will fail to constitute noninfringing fair use. An example here would be the copying of only the lyrics (and not the melody) of a copyrighted chorus or hymn. In all of these cases, a finding of fair use will be unlikely because (1) such acts of copying constitute mere reproductions of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose; (2) the nature of the work involved does not suggest a broad definition of fair use; (3) the amount of copyrighted material that is copied is significant in terms of both quantity and quality; (4) similar acts of copying by other churches would “adversely affect the market for or value of the copyrighted work.” In other words, none of the four fair use factors ordinarily will support a finding of fair use.27
One of the most common fair use issues concerns the reproduction of copyrighted materials for educational purposes. In 1975, negotiating teams representing authors, publishers, and the “Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision” met informally in an attempt to reach a “meeting of the minds” as to permissible educational uses of copyrighted material. The parties reached an agreement, known as the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not--For--Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals. The House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 reprinted the Agreement in full, and further noted that the guidelines set forth in the Agreement “are a reasonable interpretation of the minimum standards of fair use.”28 The educational guidelines are very restrictive, and rarely will apply to churches. They apply primarily to copying by teachers in not--for--profit educational institutions for their own research or class preparation, and also to limited copying for classroom use. There are strict requirements as to the amount of material that can be copied under the guidelines for classroom use. For example, in the case of literary works (“prose”), teachers are limited to (a) either a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 words, or (b) an excerpt from any prose work of not more than 1,000 words or 10 percent of the work, whichever is less, but in any event a minimum of 500 words. Other requirements apply. The guidelines also warn that “copying shall not substitute for the purchase of books, publishers' reprints or periodicals.”
Shortly after the guidelines for books and periodicals were formulated, representatives of music publishers and music educators met to draft guidelines relative to music. It must be emphasized that the stated purpose of the guidelines, as with the guidelines for books and periodicals, was “to state the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use.” The parties acknowledged that “there may be instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines . . . may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.” Nevertheless, the House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 reprinted the guidelines in full,29 and further noted that the guidelines “are a reasonable interpretation of the minimum standards of fair use.” Like the guidelines for books and periodicals, the music guidelines are very restrictive and rarely will apply to churches. Perhaps most importantly, these guidelines permit “emergency photocopying to replace purchased copies which for any reason are not available for an imminent performance provided purchased replacement copies shall be substituted in due course.” Clearly, this provision will be of little use to churches, since it requires that (1) copies of music have been purchased, (2) they are unavailable for an imminent performance because they are suddenly destroyed or lost, and (3) the church purchases replacement copies in due course.
c. Religious Displays
Section 109(c) provides that “the owner of a particular copy lawfully made . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.” Section 109(d) provides further that the privilege granted under section 109(c) does not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, “extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.”
This section is of considerable relevance to many churches, and particularly to those that use transparencies and slides of copyrighted music in the course of worship services. Recall that one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is the right to display a copyrighted work publicly. Section 109(c) limits this exclusive right by adopting the general principle that the lawful owner of a copy of a copyrighted work should be able to put the copy on public display without the consent of the copyright owner. The House Report to the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that a copyright owner's exclusive right of public display
would not apply where the owner of a copy wishes to show it directly to the public, as in a gallery or display case, or indirectly as through an opaque projector. Where the copy itself is intended for projection, as in the case of a photographic slide, negative, or transparency, the public projection of a single image would be permitted as long as the viewers are “present at the place where the copy is located” . . . . [T]he public display of an image of a copyrighted work would not be exempted from copyright control if the copy from which the image was derived were outside the presence of the viewers. . . . Moreover, the exemption would extend only to public displays that are made “either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time.”30
Perhaps most significantly, the House Report specifies that section 109(d) qualifies the privilege granted in section 109(b) “by making it clear that [it does] not apply to someone who merely possesses a copy or phonorecord without having acquired ownership of it. Acquisition of an object embodying a copyrighted work . . . carries with it no privilege to . . . display it publicly under section 109(b).”31
Section 109(c) would authorize the use of an opaque projector to display a lawfully obtained copy of a musical work in the course of choir rehearsals or church services since the opaque projector displays an image of a lawfully made copy consisting ordinarily of either sheet music or a page in a hymnal. But if a church makes a transparency of an existing copyrighted musical work without authorization, such a transparency would not be a lawfully made copy and thus could not be displayed without infringing the owner's copyright. Section 109(b) would authorize the display of a transparency in the course of choir rehearsals or church services if the transparency constituted a lawfully made copy. This could occur in three ways. First, a transparency purchased from an authorized vendor would be a lawful copy and could be displayed publicly. Second, a transparency of a public domain work could be fabricated and displayed. Third, a transparency made with the express permission of the copyright owner would be a lawful copy.
Congress has stated that the purpose of section 109 is not only to preserve the traditional privilege of the owner of a copy to display it directly, but also to place reasonable restrictions on the ability of others to display it indirectly in such a way that the copyright owner's market for reproduction and distribution of copies would be affected.32 Accordingly, it is likely that continued public display of a copyrighted work by a church would tend to result in a loss of the protection afforded by section 109(b). For example, if a church choir director projected a copyrighted musical arrangement on a screen for several weeks in succession in an effort to have his choir memorize the work, the repetitive display of the work might not be eligible for protection under section 109(b).
d. The Nonprofit Performance Exception
Section 110(4) contains a general exception to the exclusive right of a copyright owner to publicly perform his or her copyrighted work. It provides:
[P]erformance of a nondramatic literary or musical work otherwise than in a transmission to the public, without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and without payment of any fee or other compensation for the performance to any of its performers, promoters, or organizers, [does not constitute copyright infringement] if—(A) there is no direct or indirect admission charge; or (B) the proceeds, after deducting the reasonable costs of producing the performance, are used exclusively for educational, religious, or charitable purposes and not for private financial gain, except where the copyright owner has served notice of objection to the performance under the following conditions; (i) the notice shall be in writing and signed by the copyright owner or such owner's duly authorized agent; and (ii) the notice shall be served on the person responsible for the performance at least seven days before the date of the performance, and shall state the reasons for the objection; and (iii) the notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.
Let's consider a number of important aspects of this important exemption.
(1) The performance must not have a profit motive.
(2) No fee or compensation can be paid to the performers (or promoters or organizers) for the performance. This condition does not prevent performers from receiving a salary for duties that include a particular performance. For example, performances by a school band do not lose the benefit of this exemption merely because the band conductor is a music teacher who receives an annual salary for performing his duties, so long as he receives no fee or payment for any particular performance.
(3) There must either be no direct or indirect admissions charge, or alternatively, if an admissions charge is assessed, then any amounts left after deducting the reasonable costs of producing the performance must be used solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. If there is an admissions charge, then the copyright owner is given the authority to “veto” the performance by serving upon the person responsible for the performance a notice objecting to the performance. Such a notice must be in a writing that is signed by the copyright owner; it must be served upon the person responsible for the performance at least seven days before the date of the performance; and, it must state the reasons for the objection. The impact of this provision is limited severely by the fact that section 110(4) does not require that the copyright owner be notified that his or her work is going to be performed at a nonprofit event with an admissions charge.
e. Authorization from Copyright Owner
Even if none of the exceptions to copyright infringement discussed above is clearly applicable, a particular use of copyrighted material may be authorized by the copyright owner. For example, assume that a church choir director wishes to perform a particular song during a worship service, that she has a single octavo, and that she cannot obtain additional copies locally and that it is too late to order copies by mail. While this “emergency need” to make unauthorized copies is not a recognized exception to copyright infringement, the director is free to contact the copyright owner directly and request permission to make copies. If permission is granted, then the making of copies will not constitute infringement.
Many music publishers have very liberal policies with respect to church music. Some music publishers grant “blanket licenses” to churches, authorizing them to make copies of any song in the publisher's repertory for an annual fee. Occasionally, several publishers and composers will assign the right to license the use of their works to a single company in return for the payment of a royalty. The company acts as a clearinghouse on behalf of the publishers and composers, granting blanket licenses to churches in exchange for a fee that is apportioned among the various publishers and composers. Perhaps the first such arrangement involving religious music was implemented by F.E.L. Publications, Ltd., in the 1970s. F.E.L. obtained the rights to 1400 songs, and offered annual licenses to churches for a fee of $100. The annual license authorized a church to copy any of the listed songs. Further, the purchaser was granted the right to perform the music and text at not--for--profit performances for purposes of worship or classroom use. A church that wanted to use one of F.E.L.'s listed songs could not deal directly with any of the authors or composers whose musical works or copyrights had been exclusively assigned to F.E.L. F.E.L.'s annual license differed from traditional marketing of music in that it did not distinguish between songs, but charged a lump sum for which the licensee received the use rights to all of F.E.L.'s 1400 available compositions, even though the purchaser desired to use only a few of the more popular songs. It also differed from usual marketing practices in that it relied heavily on the licensee to patrol its own use. On the anniversary date of the license, the customer had to destroy all copies made of the virtually unlimited number allowed, unless it elected to pay F.E.L another $100 for an additional annual license.33
A federal district court found the F.E.L. blanket licensing scheme to be a “tying contract” that was illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Specifically, the court observed that
by obtaining assignments of the songs with the right, on behalf of the composers, to license their use for an annual fee, and by obtaining assignment of copyrights for the same purpose, F.E.L. either absolutely controls or has ownership power over copyrights to hymnals, songbooks, and the 1400 religious songs listed in its master title index. A Catholic church or parish that wants to purchase the right to copy and use a song either in one of F.E.L.'s hymnals, songbooks, or those listed in its master title index, cannot deal directly with owners of the copyrighted works listed by F.E.L. In most instances, a church or parish does not desire permission to use all of F.E.L.'s listed songs; there is no interest in all of the songs in F.E.L.'s hymnals, songbooks, and listed in the master index. The most desired are about 25 or 30 of the more popular or “blockbuster” songs. Yet, F.E.L.'s policy has always been “all or nothing”; the church or parish desiring to purchase the right to copy and use some of the listed songs has to pay for permission to use all of them. The songs are different; in many instances, the composers are different, yet purchase of the right to use the more popular has been tied by F.E.L. to the purchase of all, including the less popular. It is now well known that a tying arrangement whereby a party agrees to sell one product but only on condition that the buyer also agrees to purchase a different or tied product is prohibited by the Sherman Act, and by the Clayton Act.
The F.E.L. license was an exclusive license, meaning that a composer gave F.E.L. the sole right to market his or her song. While an in--depth discussion of the legality of such licenses is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that a few courts have upheld the legal validity of nonexclusive licenses. For example, ASCAP and BMI operate in much the same manner as F.E.L. in the sense that members give ASCAP and BMI the right to license the performance or broadcast of members' copyrighted works. ASCAP and BMI in turn grant blanket licenses authorizing licensees, for a flat fee, to use any work in the ASCAP or BMI repertory. ASCAP and BMI have been the target of lawsuits alleging violation of federal antitrust laws (because of “tying arrangements”). So far, ASCAP and BMI blanket licenses have been upheld on the ground that they are nonexclusive. This means that ASCAP and BMI members retain the right to directly license their works to third parties. Composers that assigned their rights to F.E.L. were not afforded this right (they granted F.E.L. the exclusive right to license the performance and reproduction of their works).
A similar approach is currently being tested by Christian Copyright Licensing, Inc. (CCLI) of Portland, Oregon. CCLI has attempted to avoid the antitrust issue by having publishers and composers enter into nonexclusive assignments of their musical works with CCLI. While CCLI acts as a clearinghouse for several publishers and composers, the publishers and composers remain free to directly market and license their works to individual churches. Churches that purchase a blanket license from CCLI are authorized to make copies of any song in the CCLI repertory (which includes the works of several publishers and composers) for congregational use, for the duration of the license period (ordinarily one year). This means, for example, that churches are free to make bulletin inserts and transparencies. Churches also are authorized to make recordings of services that contain copyrighted music (in the CCLI repertory), provided that copies of the recording are distributed without charge, and do not exceed a specified amount. The making of certain musical arrangements is also permitted.
Churches must make a record of what songs they sing or perform in the course of a year, and file reports with CCLI. These reports help CCLI allocate royalties to the various publishers and composers. The fee that a church pays is based on a number of variables, including the size of the church and the kind of copying involved. In principle, the CCLI approach has the advantage of making compliance with copyright law much easier. Of course, the success of the project will depend upon four key factors—the number of songs in the CCLI repertory, the number of churches that obtain a CCLI license, the fee that CCLI will charge, and the degree of voluntary compliance by churches with the terms and conditions of the CCLI license. Churches wishing to contact CCLI may write them at the following address: Christian Copyright Licensing, Inc., 7600 N.E. Glisan Street, Portland, Oregon 97213. Further, note that CCLI licenses only apply to limited cases of reproduction and performance of religious musical works. They do not convey any authorization with respect to duplication of literary works (books and articles), and they do not apply in all cases to reproduction or performance of music. Accordingly, even if CCLI licenses are widely accepted, they must not be viewed as a solution to all of a church's copyright concerns.
For related information on this topic see the following articles:Regulation of Charitable Solicitations
Limitations on Charitable Giving
Federal and State Securities Laws
Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
Americans with Disabilities Act
Political Activities by Churches and Other Religious Organizations